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Abstract. This paper applies the Beer Viable Systems Model 
(VSM) approach to the study of nuclear accidents. It relates how 
organizational structures and rules are affected by accidents in 
the attempt to improve safety and reduce risk.  The paper 
illustrates this process with reference to a number of accidents.  
The dynamic cybernetic aspect of the VSM approach to 
organizations yields a better understanding of the need for good 
decision-making to minimize risk and how organizations really 
operate. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with an examination of 
management aspects associated with nuclear power 
operations, such as safety of the public and plant 
personnel together with the economics of power 
production, used by electric power utilities.  Key 
issues associated with nuclear power are safety and 
economics with the accent on safety.  Modern 
industry is built upon the economic exploitation of 
various processes for the benefit of both the owners 
of the processes and society in general.  If the 
processes are not run economically, eventually they 
will fail, so society exhorts companies to be 
economic.   
Safety for most industries is not a dominant 
consideration, however in the nuclear industry it is 
a defining requirement, if the consequences of 
accidents cannot be held to a small impact on 
society, and then nuclear power will not be 
successful in the long term.  Another aspect that 
affects the nuclear power industry is the fear that 
the ‘genie will escape from the bottle’.  One can see 
this effect in the case of the nuclear accidents that 
have occurred in the last twenty years, namely 
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and just recently, 
Fukushima.   
These accidents have had a social impact beyond 
their actual direct effects, although both Chernobyl 
and Fukushima did lead to a number of deaths and 
release of radioactive materials.  In the case of 
Fukushima, the direct effect of the tsunami on the 
countryside and people was vastly more extensive 
than the nuclear power plant incident resulting from 
the earthquake/tsunami.   
For safety to work effectively and efficiently, the 
management organization must be reliable – 
nuclear power plant qualify for the status of an 
HRO (Highly Reliable Organization),  In the 1970s 
a systems scientist, Stafford Beer, developed the 
Viable Systems Model specially to examine the 
operations of a organization [1].  For the purpose of 
this study the model will be used to examine 
whether the organization can deal with crisis, i.e. 
does it qualify as a HRO. 
 
 
II. VSM, A CYBERNETIC VIEW OF MANAGEMENT 
ORGANIZATION 
The purpose of this section is to present 
information on the Viable Systems Model (VSM) 
developed by Beer [1] and its application to better 
diagnose management systems.  The hierarchical 
methods to depict management structures do not 
help one to understand how these operations 
actually function dynamically.  VSM is a method to 
underpin understanding of management dynamics 
in organizations based upon cybernetics.  
The key word in VSM is ‘viable: capable of 
maintaining a separate existence.’  If one considers 
the roles of the various parts of an organization, one 
can quickly recognize that some parts make 
decisions, others plan operations and others 
carryout those plans.  Between these parts, there are 
communication channels transporting information 
about the processes being operated on and 
 instructions to operations personnel to increase or 
decrease activities.   
Beer recognized these relationships as being 
similar to the detailed actions and responses of 
human and animal bodies, in other words the same 
principles being used to understand how animals 
operate were relevant to the diagnosis of human 
organizations. 
Cybernetics is the study of the structure of 
regulatory or control systems, which are seen in 
animals as well as in business systems.   
Cybernetics is closely related to control system 
theory.  An introduction to the underlying 
techniques of cybernetics is given in Ashby [2].  
Cybernetics is equally applicable to organization 
and control of physical and social management 
systems. One application of VSM was to air traffic 
management (ATM) in Saudi Arabia [3].  In later 
sections, VSM will be applied to the consideration 
of safety of nuclear power plants as a main thrust of 
the paper.     
VSM was proposed as a better way of 
understanding and diagnosing organizational 
behaviour.  The approach has been applied to 
manufacturing, food distribution (Walker, 1991), 
software development by Herring and Kaplan 
(2001), etc.   VSM was applied by Beer to 
government operations in Chile under President 
Allende, circa 1970-73.  This shows the diversity of 
VSM as a tool for diagnosing various management 
schemes. 
VSM is now discussed.  Figure 1 depicts a simple 
version of a VSM model of a system, in which there 
is a central management body that determines 
policy and gives top-level guidance.  In this 
representation, a regulatory/control body controls 
various activities at the working level (supervisors).  
Then there are operational activities, from running a 
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to shoe-making, tire 
production, etc.  The environment represents the 
public, the physical environment or even the 
Government.  Feedback occurs and information or 
society actions can result from the activities of the 
plant or the organization.  For example in the case 
of shoes, the public may change its taste from black 
shoes to red shoes and this would lead to a change 
in production rates for  black and red shoes.  
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Figure 1 Basic VSM Figure depicting Key Elements within the Approach 
The regulator in Figure 1 operates in a similar 
manner to normal equipment controller.  The set 
point could be related to say the number of shoes to 
be produced per month as set by top management of 
the manufacturer.  The regulator has a number of 
rules, which correspond to the algorithm of the 
controller and can be quite complex.  These rules 
could cover such things as the colour ranges of the 
shoes, the sizes and selection of materials.  The 
rules may also determine the use of machines, 
targeted hours per shoe for manufacturing and the 
length of run producing the shoes.  The VSM model 
depicted here is a simplified model of a shoe 
manufacturing business.  Feedback occurs from the 
operations function as to the construction and 
assembly of the shoes and such things as the utility 
of certain machines to produce different kinds of 
shoe and of the downtime requirements due to the 
need to maintain the machines, and the impact of 
shift changes of operating personnel.  The VSM 
model structures can be expanded to include sub-
units with a similar structure to that of Figure 1.  
The expansion of VSM depends on the needs of the 
user. 
The simple VSM model can be used to examine 
the relationships between the various key parts of 
the organization, i.e. management, the control rules 
for operating the organization, the operations 
portion and the environmental (the public and other 
organizations affected by the organizations actions).  
VSM models focus on both feed-back and feed 
forward signals that tie the various units together 
and make it possible for the whole system to work.  
The dynamic aspect of the VSM model changes an 
organizational chart into an operating entity; 
 without the roles played by all parts and their 
communications, the organization is unlikely to 
function successfully.   
In practice a more detailed form of VSM is used 
to illustrate some managerial and supervisory 
aspects of organizations.  Figure 2 shows a complex 
version of VSM that will be used in relation to 
utility management and associated personnel when 
considering the impact of accidents on management.  
It is as well to select a compact model in order to 
show the dynamic relationships between the various 
levels of an organization. 
One can see here that the management function is 
now represented by S5, S4 and S3, the 
communications are represented by S2 and S3* and 
operations by the S1 groups (both supervisors and 
operators).  The environment is made up of local 
and global effects.  The environment covers public 
and the regulators.  S3, S4 and S5 represent the top 
management functions of planning, economics and 
plant management.  The S3* and S2 functions 
represent co-ordination and auditing functions. 
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Figure 2 More Complex Version of VSM 
 
Later, several organizations will be examined to 
show how deficiencies within organizations can 
lead to accidents and even to the demise of 
organizations. 
 
III. NPP ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
This section is concerned with a more detailed 
examination of the various management levels 
within a utility covering maintenance and plant 
operations.  Figure 3 shows a typical nuclear power 
plant organization. A number of utility organization 
structures were examined during the early phases of 
the project, but the one given in the IAEA report 
[10] captures the management structure in an 
idealized form.   
The figure reflects some of the various functions 
carried out at single station NPP.  The share holders 
and the Board are not part of the operating plant but 
are important in terms of holding the President, 
CEO and CFO accountable to the public and of 
course to the interests of the share holders and the 
other stake holders, the employees.  Utilities with 
multiple stations (or Fleet organization) would have 
a corporate structure covering each station within a 
Fleet organization.   
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 Figure 3 Typical Nuclear Power Plant Organization 
 
A Fleet organization may have some advantages 
over the single unit organization both economically 
and operationally, since some functions are carried 
out for all stations.  The figure indicates that the 
overall responsibility for a plant, economic and 
safety is with the Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO).  
The CNO may have a committee advising him on 
safety and economic issues.  The committee may 
consist of internal plant personnel and outside 
 experts.  The CNO reports to the Utility President 
and Chief Operating Officer.   
The utilities are influenced by a number of 
different organizations, such as public utility 
commissions whose job is ensure that the public has 
access to inexpensive and reliable power.  There are 
other organizations which have a role in dealing 
with the utilities that affect some aspect or other of 
their operation.  Figure 4 depicts the inter-
relationships between the utilities and other 
organizations, such as Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), etc.   
Like most companies, there are the company 
officers, President, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) report to the 
Board of Trustees/Governors.  Later, details of the 
NRC and INPO organizations will be covered.  
The utilities are influenced by a number of 
different organizations, such as public utility 
commissions whose job is ensure that the public has 
access to inexpensive and reliable power.  There are 
other organizations which have a role in dealing 
with the utilities to affect some aspect or other of 
their operation.  Figure 4 depicts the inter-
relationships between the utilities and other 
organizations, such as Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), etc.   
The main organizations that interface with the 
nuclear utilities are the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Institute of 
Nuclear Operations (INPO).  Also the President and 
Congress have their part to play in this process.  
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Figure 4 Diagram showing the Interrelationships within the US Nuclear 
Industry 
 
The NRC regulates the US Nuclear Utilities.  The 
NRC has five main components that enable them to 
regulate effectively:  
1. Developing Regulations and guidance for 
licensees 
2. Licensing utilities to operate NPPs  
3. Oversee NPPs to ensure licensees comply 
with license requirements 
4. Research is also covered by the NRC to 
provide insights into the causes of accidents.   
5. PRA techniques are also used to support 
commission decisions 
6. The NRC evaluates operational experience, 
and event assessment 
The NRC plays a strong role in regulation; 
however the rules and procedures of the process 
have changed over the years as a result of lessons 
learned from accidents, both in the US and abroad. 
As a result of the Three Mile Island, unit #2 
accident in March 1979 [7], INPO was set up by 
the NPP utilities to assist the NPP utilities to 
enhance their “professionalism” in dealing with 
reactor power plant safety.  The word 
“professionalism” is associated with Admiral 
Rickover and the US Nuclear Navy, meaning a 
well trained and conscientious group very aware of 
the need to follow safety policies.  Although the 
Admiral was concerned with submarine 
 operations, much of his approach applies to the 
civilian NPP operations.  Many in the leadership of 
INPO have come from the Nuclear Navy and 
Rickover’s philosophy has influenced INPO’s 
approach in working with the US utilities.  
Accordingly INPO’s mission statement is: 
“To promote the highest levels of safety and 
reliability – to promote excellence – in the 
operation of commercial nuclear power plants.” 
(INPO web site, www.inpo.info)  
 
INPO has four main activities: 
1. Plant Evaluations, INPO teams 
observe NPP operations, analyse 
processes, ‘shadow personnel’ and     
question personnel.   
 
2. Training and Accreditation,  the INPO 
National Academy for Nuclear 
Training provides training and support    
for nuclear professionals 
3. Events Analysis and Information 
Exchange 
4. Assistance, at the request of NPPs,  
 
INPO provides assistance with specific technical 
and management issues in the area of plant 
operation and support.  The interactions between 
INPO and the utilities are close and complex 
depending on the needs of the utilities.  INPO 
performs many tasks such as training 
improvements, independent reviews of plant 
operations.  Some interactions are frequent and 
others are based upon assessed needs. 
 
IV VSM APPLIED TO NPP ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Earlier a VSM was depicted in figure 2 (‘More 
Complex Version of VSM’), which is a version of 
Beer’s original VSM.  He referred to a number of 
parts of the organization and denoted them as sets 
of System’s from S1 to S5.  The upper management 
functions were S3 to S5 and the lower level 
functions were S1 to S2 and also included S3* 
which was an audit function.  Here that VSM model 
structure has been modified to conform to a US 
nuclear utility organization.  This modified VSM is 
shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 VSM model of a US Nuclear Utility 
 
The figure models a current single US NPP type 
of organization, which involve the lessons learned 
over the years from the impact of accidents upon 
the structure of the utilities and the rest of the 
industry.  The structure of both the industry and 
each utility was less complex at the beginning of 
the nuclear utility age.  The Three Mile Island, 
(TMI) accident has had a deep influence on the US 
industry and led to the formation of INPO.  The 
impact of the accident led to the need to enhance 
the importance of the reactor operator in performing 
key safety functions in the operation of NPPs.  This 
has led in turn to modifications and changes in a 
number of support organizations.  Modifications to 
Beer’s VSM figure have been made to reflect these 
changes in that INPO and a training feature have 
been added.  Operator training was included from 
the beginning, but the degree, complexity of 
training and importance has been increased since 
TMI.  So the general structure of control of the 
organizations has remained much the same, but a 
number functions added to reflect the need to factor 
safety within the VSM representation.  
Figure 5 reflects the VSM equivalent of the 
organizational chart shown in Figure 3.  The VSM 
model covers the roles of the CEO, CFO and the 
Board of Trustees together as equivalent to S5.  In 
figure 3, there is also a President, which has been 
 subsumed within the S5 category.  This 
combination covers the top decision-making 
function of VSM.   
The Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) fills the S4 
category of VSM, which covers the environmental 
influences upon the functioning of the NPP, so here 
it is way of binding together the needs of the 
environment to the requirements of the organization.   
The posture of the CNO towards the CEO, etc. is 
important.  The CEO is responsible to ensure both 
financial and safety viability of the utility.  The 
CFO supplies the analysis and requirements for 
financial viability of the organization and Board 
represents the interests of the stockholders.   
The CNO should uphold the safety requirements 
of the NPP and ensure the efficiency of the 
organization in meeting safety requirements while 
being fairly frugal.  The Plant manager reports to 
the CNO and is responsible for the running of the 
plant.  The operations manager and supervisors 
report to the Plant manager, along with 
Maintenance and Test and Calibration.  Plant 
manager is equivalent to the S3 function in the case 
of VSM.  The lower level managers/supervisors for 
operations, maintenance and test/calibration and 
their staff are equivalent to S1 functions. 
The other functions covered in the Beer VSM are 
S2 and S3* functions.  In the case of the utility, the 
S2 is a coordination role to ensure that operations, 
maintenance, test/calibration are coordinated.  The 
staffs of the latter two functions have to coordinate 
their activities with the reactor operators to ensure 
that the safety of the plant is not affected by these 
activities.   
Additionally, the operators draw upon the office 
of the Head of Assurance via the group performing 
plant probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs).  
Usually the operators have access to PRA program 
aids that enable them to switch certain pumps and 
valves, etc to see if loss of these components would 
increase the risk of operation and by how much.  
There are technical specifications for operation that 
guide the decisions made by the operators, for 
example pump, P#2134 can be withdrawn from 
service for no more than 10 hours after which the 
plant has to be shutdown.  If this operation is being 
carried out with operations of valve, V#2334, then 
the plant has to be shut down.  These operations are 
carried out under the guidance of rules called 
technical specifications for running the plant and 
agreed with the NRC.   
The S3* function is there to audit the operations 
to see if they correspond to defined operations 
outlined in operational or maintenance manuals.  
The control room operators have a log in which all 
maintenance, etc. operations are recorded and when 
they occurred.  This record also records 
accidents/incidents and is carried out as part of the 
operators’ role.  There are also automatic recorders, 
displays and computer output to backup the 
functions of the operators to ensure accurate records 
are available for post accident/incident analysis.  As 
mentioned before, the utility has to inform the NRC 
of accident/incidents within a short time after the 
accident/incident.  The on-site NRC inspectors will 
also investigate and report to their area inspection 
group.     
With a view of trying to simplify the VSM 
representation of the utility organization certain 
parts of the actual organization have been omitted.  
For example, the following functions have been 
omitted: Engineering, Nuclear support group, 
Outage group, Site support and Contracts.  This is 
not to say that these functions are not important, but 
rather the examination of utility response to 
accident is that which is of concern here. 
 
V Outline of some Accidents 
The purpose of this section is to examine a series 
of accidents to consider the organization causal 
aspects associated with them.  Also it is also an 
exercise in using VSM methodology to see what 
might be improved relative to the organizations to 
consider the balance between safety and economics 
and how to adapt VSM to high risk organizations.  
One thing should be said at the beginning of this 
study, accident reports sometimes lack the detail to 
be able to conclusively show in detail the impact of 
the actions of all the parties involved.  Oft times the 
impact of prior decisions of management do not 
arise in the analysis of the accidents.  In some 
accident reports communication protocols are not 
discussed, yet communications between parties are 
extremely important.  In aircraft incidents, for 
example poor communications can play an 
 important role, but in other accidents this issue is 
not raised.  
One purpose of VSM was as a tool to diagnose 
organizational structures and manner of operation.  
One can use VSM to help diagnose various 
management relationships from top management, 
governments to lower level managers interacting 
with operators.  By analysing accidents, one can see 
how the various units, making up the organization, 
work together or otherwise.  The dynamics of the 
processes are on display, which are difficult to see 
during steady state operation.  However, even if an 
accident has not yet taken place, it may be possible 
to examine the consequences of decisions.  
Sometimes, the effects of managerial decisions can 
take awhile to manifest their effects upon the 
operation.  
Here a number of case studies are used to shed 
light on how organizations operate and what are the 
rules required to ensure that the whole organization 
works safely and economically.  In studying the 
forces at play in an accident, one may come to the 
conclusion that in some cases it is the interactions 
of a small group of persons (supervisors and 
operators) and in other cases it is the decisions the 
top managers that leads to an accident.  The VSM 
approach is used here to capture these various 
interactions, wherever possible in order to 
understand both the causes of the accident and its 
propagation.  Included in the set of case studies are 
examples of different sources of accidents. 
Nuclear accident analysis is key part of this paper, 
but it is considered useful to examine accidents in 
other industries, since it is likely that the lessons 
can be learned from these other accidents that are 
applicable to the nuclear field and vice versa.  As 
was stated in the beginning of the chapter, there are 
multiple reasons to study accidents: to understand 
the accident progression, what are the 
organizational causes of an accident, how does one 
organization compare with other organizations and 
what can one learn from the accident in terms of 
what is important about an organization’s 
characteristics to minimize or fail to minimize the 
occurrence of an accident and terminate/mitigate its 
effect.   
A number of case studies have been selected from 
accidents/incidents that have occurred in the 
nuclear and other industries to examine this 
proposition.  The following cases are addressed 
here: 
1. Three Mile Island Unit #2, March, 1979 
2. Fukushima Accident, March, 2011 
3. Challenger Shuttle Accident, January, 1986 
4. North East Utilities issues leading to failure 
of utility due to change of management, 
circa 1986 to 1997, [8] 
5. Unknown Utility: leaking valve packing 
situation [9] 
6. BP Oil rig, both BP and US government 
issues, April, 2010 onwards with the leak 
officially sealed September, 2010  
There are many other cases that could be studied, 
for example: 
7. Davis Besse accidents, loss of feed and 
auxiliary feed,  Outage report June 1985 to 
December 1986 from Union of Concerned 
Scientists 
8. Davis Besse near accident reactor vessel 
head penetration, March 2002 
9. Millstone Unit 2, white finding Aug 8, 
2011, reactor trip from over-speed of turbine 
during turbine valve test, see NRC report, 
raises question about NRC oversight 
10. BP Texas City refinery fire and explosion, 
March, 2005 
 
Since the space available here is limited, attention is 
paid primarily to TMI, Unit#2 and Fukushima 
accidents.  TMI caused a major shift in US thinking 
about the role of humans in control of accidents.  
The Fukushima accident is likely to have large 
effect on the Japanese Government and Utilities.  It 
also has some strong messages for other countries’ 
industries.  This is not to say that the other 
accidents are not significant, they are, but here the 
concentration is on these two accidents.  
 
A. Three Mile Island, Unit #2 Accident 
 
The accident started with a loss of main feed due 
to an incorrect filter switchover procedure.  The 
Three Mile Island NPPs are designed by Babcock 
and Wilcox and have once-through steam 
generators.  Attention to water quality is paid for all 
 steam generators, but once-through units are 
particularly sensitive.  The main feedwater have in-
line filters to improve the feed supply quality, but 
they need to be replaced at frequent intervals. It was 
during the switch-over process that the main feed 
flow was cut off.   
Both the reactor and the main turbine trip 
automatically.  In response to this, the auxiliary 
feedwater system should have started, but failed to 
start due to a maintenance error.  This was not 
spotted by the control-room crew, since all 
auxiliary feed isolation valves were closed.  All 
safety injection and residual heat removal pumps 
started due to the correct generation of the Safety 
Injection (SI) signal.  Due to heat-up of the reactor 
primary system, reactor pressure increased and the 
pressure operated relief valves (PORVs) opened.  
This is the normal response.  Subsequentially, the 
reactor pressure dropped and continued to drop 
until it reached the saturation temperature pressure 
and boiling in the core started.   
Once the reactor pressure falls below a low 
pressure set point the PORVs should have closed.  
The PORVs did not close, but the operators thought 
that they had, since the PORVs were indicated as 
having closed.  Error in indication was caused by 
poor instrumentation design for the PORV.  
Following boiling in the core, the generated steam 
rose to the top of the reactor dome and displaced 
the water there.  The displaced water moved into 
the pressurizer and the level within the pressurizer 
rose.  Eventually, the pressurizer fills.  The 
operators thought that the reactor pressure was 
under control and that Safety Injection was 
continuing to inject water and the change in water 
level was due to the safety injection flow.  
Therefore, they decided it was not necessary to 
continue to run the safety injection pumps and shut 
them off.  The reactor decay heat continued causing 
boiling and eventually the top of the reactor core 
was uncovered, the cladding was not being 
effectively cooled by the steam flow and its 
temperature rose and melting of the clad occurred.  
The clad is one of the three barriers to the release of 
radioactivity, along with reactor vessel and steam 
generator tubing and the containment.  With the 
failure of the cladding some fuel pellets fell to the 
bottom of the reactor vessel.   
Subsequently, the control-room crew with 
guidance from a unit #1 supervisor realized that the 
core was uncovered and switched on the Safety 
Injection (SI) system, this further accelerated core 
damage by shattering the overheated clad, when it 
was exposed to the cold safety injection water.  The 
consequence was that the core of the Unit #2 
reactor was destroyed and there was a mixture of 
reactor fuel pellets, and cladding fused together at 
the bottom of the reactor vessel.   
The whole unit was written off, a large economic 
loss, but very few people were affected, since most 
of the radioactive material was contained in the 
reactor and containment.  This was in line with the 
“Defence in Depth” philosophy of the United States.  
 
B. Fukushima Daiichi NPPs Accident 
 
The Fukushima accident took place in Japan on 
March 11th, 2011 and affected a number of nuclear 
plants operated by the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company.  The plants were the six units of the 
Daiichi station and Daini station and are about 160 
miles north of Tokyo on the north-east coast.  The 
four of the six plants that made up the Daiichi were 
the ones principally affected.  The accident was 
caused by large earthquakes and later followed by 
enormous tsunamis.  The largest earthquake and the 
some of the tsunamis exceeded the design bases for 
the nuclear power plants (NPPs).   
A large seismic event (Richter Scale 9.0) 
occurred on March 2011 off the north-east coast of 
Japan and caused massive amount of damage 
including affecting electric power distribution and 
led to the automatic shutdown of the Fukushima 
NPPs (Daiichi and Daini).  This was an entirely 
correct response.  The actual ground acceleration 
was 0.56g versus 0.447g.  The standby diesels 
started up and the plants were operating safely.  Of 
the six NPPs of Daiichi only units #1, #2 and #3 
were operating the other three NPPs were shutdown 
for various reasons and were not operating. 
One result of this type of earthquake (a sub-duction 
fault) was a series of large Tsunamis were 
generated.  The INPO report [10] was produced 
 later than the Braun report [12] and is much more 
detailed, but still does address questions related to 
why certain actions were and were not taken.  The 
Tsunami caused devastation of the area around the 
region where the NPPs were located.  Thousands 
were killed and their property destroyed, roads 
swept away and rail transport ceased along with a 
loss of communications.  The INPO report indicates 
that there were multiple tsunamis, seven altogether.  
It also states that several after-shocks of lower 
magnitude occurred before the tsunamis arrived.  At 
least one of the waves was approximately 46 to 49 
feet (14 to 15 meters) based on water level 
indications on the buildings.  The design basis 
tsunami was 18.7feet (5.7meters), so the actual 
largest tsunami was well above the design basis and 
the ground level.  Figure 5-5 shows the various 
measurements related to the building, and water 
levels achieved during the tsunami.  In addition to 
the above mentioned earthquake damage, the 
tsunamis were of such a size that they overflowed 
the NPP seawall protection, which was supposed to 
be bigger than the design basis for the NPPs. 
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Figure 6 Diagram showing various key water levels related to the Accident 
 
The sizes of both the earthquake and Tsunami 
magnitudes exceeded the design bases for the NPPs.  
It has been reported that seismic experts had 
informed TEPCO about two years earlier that this 
same area was devastated in 875 AD one of a 
similar size to this Tsunami and that information 
should have been included in the data base from 
which the design basis Tsunami was selected. [11]. 
 
Because of the size of the Tsunami, sea water 
caused the standby power diesels to fail, the diesel 
fuel tanks to be blown away, some battery rooms, 
and the levels in turbine halls flooded.  There were 
some diesels that air started, but could not be used 
since rest of the electrical systems had failed.  The 
grade level for reactor buildings were at 33 feet, but 
the electrical equipment Switch gear, Batteries and 
Emergency Diesel Generators were below grade 
level.  The inlet cooling system structures were at 
13 feet and it became blocked with the debris 
caused by the tsunamis and led to cooling water 
pump failures. 
The loss of diesels and battery supplies led to the 
plant being in a “Blackout” condition.   A Blackout 
is a situation in which offsite power and station 
generated power are lost.  The station generated 
power is derived from standby diesels, which are 
supposed to start up on the loss of offsite power 
within a short time.  In this case, the diesels started 
and then stopped due to the tsunami flooding the 
diesel locations.   
The Reactor control room personnel were placed 
into an emergency condition with four units in a 
hazardous condition.  Even well trained operators, 
with a well developed emergency plan, would have 
a great difficulty in knowing what to do and they 
had very little time to take action.  Initially, all went 
well following the earthquake, the reactors shut 
down (control rods inserted into the reactor core), 
the auxiliary electric supplies via the diesels came 
on and the initial stages of decay heat removal was 
being taken care of.   
There may have been some damage from the 
earthquake, but it did not lead to extensive damage 
at the plant.  However, within an hour of the 
earthquake the tsunami struck and from then 
onwards, the safety systems failed, the batteries 
failed to supply instrumental power to allow valves 
to be operated.  Under these conditions, it was 
nearly impossible to prevent core damage and loss 
of cooling to the spent fuel pools.  The crews’ only 
action was to try to reduce the pressure in the 
reactors to a point where they could use fire pumps 
to inject water (initially fresh water then sea water) 
into the core.  The crews were also faced with the 
fact, that their families and friends might have been 
 killed by the effects of the earthquake and the 
tsunami.   
The site superintendent was involved in the 
stabilization process, but it appears that the 
emergency procedures that they were practiced in 
were not designed to deal with such difficulties.  
Confusion abounded in the plant, around the plant 
and resources to help the personnel were not readily 
available.  In the surrounding areas, people were 
killed and injured, houses were damaged, 
transportation affected, cars washed out to sea, etc.  
It is believed that in somewhere in excess of 20,000 
people died and more than 110,000 houses were 
destroyed.   
A number of accident reports relating to Fukushima 
were available shortly after the accident, for 
example see [11], but they focused on the accident 
progression, what actions were taken and what was 
the state of the plants at various intervals.  The 
reports were classical in that they focused on the 
accident sequence.  Giving information about what 
was going on, such as hydrogen explosions 
occurring, and radiation releases, etc, but very 
rarely does one get a glimpse of what was 
happening as far as instructions to operators from 
plant management, TEPCO upper management, and 
the Japan Government, etc.  Of course instructions 
might have had little effect initially, in that the plant 
was already in a state where the operators could not 
determine what actions to take, since there was no 
electric power and battery power to instruments and 
controls also quickly disappeared.  Truly, not only 
was the plant in a ‘black out’, but so were the 
operational staff.   
TEPCO’s top management seemed to be out of 
touch during the early stages of the accident.  It is 
presumed that advice and help was slow in arriving.  
The Japanese government was deeply involved in 
trying to establish control over the effected 
surrounding regions.    It was a catastrophic event 
for the people of Japan.  It is little wonder that even 
the issue of a reactor disaster was not immediately 
given enough attention and resources to terminate 
the accident and mitigate the effects of core damage.  
In some ways, the site personnel did very well to 
stay and try to address problems.  Is not clear 
whether NPP staff and managers recognized the 
possibility that given the failure of fuel cooling, that 
the water covering the fuel would boil away and the 
fuel cladding would heat up and react with the 
steam and form hydrogen.  Photos of the reactor 
buildings indicate that hydrogen explosions had 
taken place.  Later, ground personnel were seen 
pumping water in the direction of the spent fuel 
pools, which are high up in the remains of the 
reactor building. 
The general impression is that local NPP personnel 
were overwhelmed by events but were trying their 
best to cope with the situation.  TEPCO 
headquarters’ personnel could not help to improve 
the situation.  Subsequently, radioactivity spread 
throughout the area.  Some of it was airborne and 
someleaked from the reactor building and spent fuel 
pools.  The full story is not yet available as to 
where all of the sources were located.  It is believed 
that some parts of the reactor vessel and its 
containment system were impacted by the 
earthquake and a leakage path to the sea could have 
come from here as well as other sources.  It will be 
some time before a complete account of the 
accident sequence and the sources of radioactive 
releases are agreed. 
The INPO report [10] covers some of the 
difficulties that the site personnel had.  A couple of 
paragraphs give an insight into the problems that 
the personnel had.  The locations were dark, 
radiation was high is some locations, equipment 
was not working, earthquakes caused vibrations and 
the threat of explosions existed. 
This extract is from the report [10] dealing with unit 
3: 
‘The operators understood they needed to 
depressurize the reactor but had no method of 
opening an SRV. All of the available batteries had 
already been used, so workers were sent to 
scavenge batteries from cars and bring them to the 
control room in an attempt to open an SRV.  
 
At 0450 (T plus 38.1 hours), workers attempted to 
open the large air-operated suppression chamber 
containment vent valve (AO-205). To open the valve, 
workers used the small generator to provide power 
to the valve solenoid. An operator checked the valve 
indication locally in the torus room, but the valve 
indicated closed. The torus room was very hot 
because of the previous use of RCIC, HPCI, and 
 SRVs; and the room was completely dark, which 
made a difficult working environment. By 0500, 
reactor pressure had exceeded 1,070 psig (7.38 
MPa gauge), reactor water level indicated 79 
inches (2,000 mm) below TAF and lowering, and 
containment pressure indicated 52.2 psia (0.36 
MPa abs)’. 
Later:- 
‘A large hydrogen explosion occurred in the Unit 3 
reactor building at 1101 on March 14. The 
explosion destroyed the secondary containment and 
injured 11 workers. The large amount of flying 
debris from the explosion damaged multiple 
portable generators and the temporary power 
supply cables. Damage to the fire engines and 
hoses from the debris resulted in a loss of seawater 
injection. Debris on the ground near the unit was 
extremely radioactive, preventing further use of the 
main condenser backwash valve pit as a source of 
water. With the exception of the control room 
operators, all work stopped and workers evacuated 
to the Emergency Response Centre for 
accountability’. 
The acronyms are: SRV=Safety Relieve Valve, 
Torus is part of the containment of a BWR (Figure 
2.9 noted as WW), RCIC =Reactor Core Isolation 
Cooling and HPCI = High Pressure Coolant 
Injection, TAF = Top of Active Fuel  
Given that a blackout had occurred and that the 
tsunami had impacted the site with roads made 
impassable with debris and even oil tanks were 
moved by the force of the tsunami, the station staff 
tried very hard against odds to cool the reactors and 
cover the reactor cores.  The loss of power affected 
not only pumps and valves, but lighting and 
availability of instrumentation, for example the staff 
did not know the water level in the reactors.  The 
crews located car batteries and connected 
instruments to determine reactor water level.  As a 
side issue, it is considered that this information was 
erroneous due to voiding in the reference legs of the 
level instruments.   
The site personnel were faced with the fact that 
given almost nothing worked, the question was 
what pieces of equipment could be placed into 
some degree of working and what actions did one 
have to take to accomplish this?  This is carrying 
out an emergence planning on the fly, as one can 
see from the second paragraph above.      
 
C. Challenger Shuttle Accident 
On the day of the accident the Challenger was 
launched and all seemed to be going well at first, 
but a short time later the main fuel tank exploded 
due to hot gases impinging on the tank coming from 
one of the solid rocket booster (SRB) units attached 
to the shuttle.  The leak was due to a SRB joint not 
functioning correctly.  The joint was made up of 
bolted flanges between two sections of the rocket 
body.   
In fact, the rocket was made up of a number of 
segmented sections that were bolted together and 
was designed in that manner to aid in transporting 
these long SRB by plane.  In order to prevent the 
joints leaking, there were two sets of flexible “O” 
rings, which allowed the joints to flex during take-
off.  For the “O” rings to work, they needed to be 
flexible and squeezed to seal the space between the 
two flanges associated with each of the SFB 
sections.   
It was asserted that the failure was caused by the 
lack of flexibility of the “O” ring material under 
environmental very cold temperatures from before 
and up to launch time.   The “O” rings lost the 
ability to seal the joints.  The consequence of this 
lack of sealing was the hot gases, formed by the 
solid rocket fuel burning to provide thrust for the 
Orbiter take-off, ended up impinging on the Main 
Fuel Tank and causing it to explode.  The Main 
Fuel Tank provided fuel for the Orbiter’s three 
main rocket motors.  Following the failure, the 
Shuttle crashed and the crew all died.  
 
D. Northeast Utilities Operations 1986 Onwards 
 
The previous cases listed devolved around 
accidents; in this case there was no single critical 
accident.  However, there was a gradual 
deterioration of the plants’ performances over the 
period under study.  The deterioration stemmed 
from the conscious decisions made by the top 
management to reduces the cost of generating 
power from all four NPPs (later another plant was 
 added) by reducing manpower in the operational 
and maintenance areas.     
As a result of the top management actions taken 
to reduce staff and being heavily focused on costs, 
led to plant availability falling from about 90% to 
56%.  Problems that occurred at the plants could 
eventually, it is believed, to a severe accident.  
Luckily, this did not happen.  Plant shut downs 
occurred due to equipment problems induced by 
failures to service equipment.  Later, it was 
discovered that there were issues associated with 
corrosion of pipe work; this could have led to an 
initiating event for a major accident.   Also, there 
were deficiencies in following up on Final Safety 
Analysis Report (FSAR) related to non compliance 
of the plant components and systems to 
requirements spelled out in the FSAR.  Again these 
problems were associated with shortage of staff. 
It could be said that the Millstone plants were 
very much approaching the point that a severe 
accident could have occurred due to issues 
associated with both systems problems and 
operational problems.  In the process of staff 
reductions due to early retirements and layoffs, the 
skill bases of the plant staff was gutted.  Reductions 
led to loss of supervisors and managers.  In addition, 
staff also informed the top managers that plant 
safety was being impacted by their actions.  This 
information was ignored and conflicts grew 
between management and staff.  
The NRC became aware of these issues by being 
informed by whistle blowers, was concerned about 
its impact on plant safety and also became 
concerned whether there was sufficient protection 
for whistle blowers from management action. 
 
E. Unknown plant: Near Accident caused by a Valve Failure 
 
This situation was one of the topics discussed in [9] 
and covers the detailed activities of maintenance 
and test crews at a un-identified plant.  The issue 
was focused on leaky stem packing associated with 
a safety significant valve and the activities of a 
large number of personnel connected one way of 
another to the valve. 
The valve issue started after there had been a 
long shutdown and the problem was due to leakage 
past valve packing.  Another factor that had a major 
affect on performance was the pressure to return the 
plant to operation.  Meetings were held a number of 
times and different levels of understanding of the 
issues among the participants and various solutions 
were proposed.  Apart from the leakage past the 
packing, there was a concern about the functionality 
of the valve and stem connection. 
  The plant at this time was shutdown, at low 
pressure and temperature.  The correct solution to 
the problem was to cool the plant further and then 
take the plant to a condition analogous to a 
refuelling condition, but it appeared that most 
groups did not wish to do this and were looking for 
short cuts of one sort or another.  One such option 
was to freeze the fluid in the pipe and that would 
allow work to proceed on the packing and fixing the 
valve/stem problem.    
However, there were considerable problems 
between the top management and personnel, which 
was manifest by safety issues being brought up with 
management and even the NRC.  These issues were 
due to reduced manpower and loss of the more 
skilled personnel taking early retirement or being 
laid-off.  The book [9] indicates a couple of things, 
a lack of awareness on the part of some of the staff 
of the defence in depth requirements as they relate 
to valve boundaries and the lack of management 
directions for the various working groups. 
 
F. BP Accident 
The Gulf oil disaster occurred during the drilling of 
a deep oil well in the Gulf.  BP was the client in the 
drilling of the oil well at the time of the accident 
given that they were the owners of the well site.  
The exploration rights were leased by the US 
Government to BP.  BP personnel were in charge of 
the operation, Transocean was the owner of the 
drilling rig, and ship and provided personnel for 
these operations, and Halliburton was the provider 
of cement and drilling “mud”.  The accident is 
described here to give an overall picture of the 
accident, but later the focus will shift to the 
measures taken by the parties to control the 
accident, terminate it and minimize the effects on 
the neighbouring states.  Although the cleanup led 
to a large number of jobs, the accident’s real impact 
was on the long term loss of fishing and vacation-
related jobs.  The accident was both an ecological 
 and economical disaster and will have a long term 
depressive effect on the region. 
The oil rig was a ship with a drilling rig mounted 
on its deck.  The rig crew had just celebrated a ten 
year no accident period and managers from the 
various companies associated with this achievement 
were present for the celebrations. 
The drilling operation was behind schedule and 
there was pressure to quickly drill through to the oil 
pool below.  Some of the operations, which go into 
preparing the hole, depended on the use of special 
cement to constrain the oil paths and prevent the 
ingress of water.  There was also the use of a 
number of spacers within the bore.  It was said later 
that the cement was sub-standard and the number of 
spacers were less than should have been used.  
Clearly, this is a question of opinion.  It has been 
asserted that testing of the quality of the cement 
was not done correctly and it should not have been 
used.  The spacing decision was taken to speed up 
the drilling process, again this was an opinion.  This 
will continue to be discussed and turn up in 
committee meetings and in court. 
The significant event was that during the drilling 
there was a large release of gas, possibly due to 
solid methane being transported to the surface and 
then evaporating on the way up.  From a safety 
point of view, one of the deck crews failed to warn 
the ship’s company of the problem and there was an 
explosion, which killed a number of crew members.   
 
V IMPACT OF ACCIDENTS ON MANAGEMENT 
 
Accidents have had an impact on NPP 
organizations and changed them in a number of 
ways, some structurally and some in redefining how 
they operate.  The early days of nuclear power the 
utilities followed the practices of the fossil, coal, 
gas and oil, power plants.  For these plants, safety 
of the public was of little concern, because the zone 
of influence of explosions was small.   
The main criterion was the cost of operations so 
the price of electricity was kept low.  Utility 
management thought of NPPs as being the same as 
fossil plants, but with a different heat source.  The 
complexity of NPPs was new to them and the 
attention to safety had a secondary impact on them.  
The net result of this was that the organizational 
structure was very similar to fossil plants.   
Also during this period, the industry as a whole, 
this includes manufacturers, and the regulators, 
thought that the safety protection of the plant was 
insured by automatic means and the role of 
operators was not too critical.  The influence of 
decay heat following a reactor trip was 
underestimated. 
 All of this was to change with the Three Mile 
Island accident.  The role of the operator was 
upgraded, training emphasised and man-machine 
interfaces improved.   
Additionally, the industry as whole decided that 
they need to improve the safety of their plants and 
formed the Institute of Nuclear Operations (INPO) 
to help bring that about.  Subsequently, utilities 
have seen the need to introduce a management 
position as a focus for nuclear safety.  The position 
is called the Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) of the 
company. 
Figure 7 shows the VSM model of a US Utility 
with interactions between the NRC and INPO.  The 
internal communications within the utility shows 
the central role of the CNO, interfacing with the 
NRC and INPO.  The plant manager is in 
communication with the maintenance and operation 
staff and there are monitoring and audit staff 
ensuring operations are being carried out per 
instructions and procedures. 
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             Figure 7 Depiction of a VSM model of a US Nuclear Utility 
 
 A VSM model of a utility in the early days of 
nuclear power would not have these features.  There 
would be no INPO, no CNO and controls and 
procedures would be much less.  Training of the 
operators would most likely not use a training 
simulator on a regular basis since the utility was 
likely not own and operate one.  Emergency 
operating procedures are now symptom-based as 
opposed to event-based.  Other accidents have also 
had an impact on the utilities, maybe not quite as 
significant as TMI, up to this time. 
One can think of the NPP business as a business 
than needs to learn and in fact INPO calls itself a 
learning organization.  However, it is observed that 
the industry is less likely to learn from deep 
understanding of the issues than from the direct 
effects of an accident.  Opinions can be argued 
around, but it is difficult to withstand the fact that 
an accident has occurred!  The model for 
improvement is captured in figure 8. 
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 Figure 8 Depiction of the Improvement Pathway 
 
The figure shows how the improvement process 
works seen as changes in the VSM structure and 
rules. 
It has been observed that the significant causes of 
accidents are to be laid at the feet of management, 
since it is management that can effect change in the 
way the organization is run.   
Often, the agent involved in an accident is the 
operator, so for example in the case of TMI it was 
the control room staff that that caused the accident 
by virtue of their actions and lack of actions.  On 
close examination, it was ruled that they were 
undertrained, did not have the right kind of 
procedures.  Also there were design issues 
associated with the PORV position indications.  So 
even in this case, the operators were placed in their 
position by the acts of others. 
As in the case of the other accidents, the role of 
management in leading to an accident is significant.  
In the case of the Challenger, it was the decision of 
NASA management to proceed with the launch in 
the face of advice from engineers not to proceed.   
In the case of North East Utilities (NU) the 
decision to cut staff and reduce maintenance work 
to increase the profitability of the operation was the 
decision of top management, President and CEO.  
The NRC was very slow in acting to ensure good 
safe operations, but in the end did act to shutdown 
the utility.  INPO found that their arguments for NU 
to improve their operations were unsuccessful.     
   The Board of Trustees, who represent the 
shareholders and could sack the President and CEO, 
failed to do so even when informed of the issues by 
NRC and INPO. 
One can also see in the case of the leaky valve 
issue and the BP oil rig accident, the role of 
management is critical.  Incidentally, in the leaky 
valve near accident case, the management of the 
plant were the self same NU managers mentioned 
before.  This indicates the management was poor in 
controlling operations.  The operators needed to 
have better understanding of the safety issues 
involved and the organization of the workforces 
was poor.  Here the management were focussing on 
force reductions without the compensating feature 
of improving efficiency of the operation. 
In the case of the Oil rig operation, BPs local 
managers were pushing the pace of drilling when 
there was a need to move slowly and carefully.  
There issues with concrete and drilling mud plus 
the unexpected presence of frozen methane being 
released and leading to explosions and fires.  The 
BOP device failed to operate correctly leading to a 
large oil release.  It appears the BP had no prior 
plans for containing such a spill.  Also the US 
Government failed to act quickly to prevent the 
spill spreading.  The Government seemed to have 
more interest in blaming BP than trying to prevent 
the subsequent ecological and economical damage 
to the various Gulf States.  So here again the role of 
decision-makers is critical.  There was a problem 
with the failure of one of the operators in failing to 
 warn the other operators of the possibility of fires 
occurring leading to a loss of life. 
In the case of the Daiichi NPPs accident there are 
many things to learn.  The following portion of this 
section will concentrate on this accident.  There are 
things associated with decision-making in both the 
long term and short term. 
The earthquake and the tsunami were 
unexpectedly high relative to what the TEPCO 
management expected.  The earthquake was 9.0 on 
the Richter scale and the level of the tsunami 
reached 48ft, which was well above the design basis 
level of 18.75feet.  The nuclear accident seen by 
itself was very bad, both economically, radiation 
release wise and from the death of a number of 
people.  However, seen in the context of the effects 
of the tsunami on the surrounding land this seems 
small.  The direct result of the tsunami about 20,000 
people died and 110,000 houses damaged.  
The Daiichi accident initiator was the tsunami, 
however the consequences can be laid at the feet of 
the top management of Tepco.  They turned a tin 
ear on the statements that the area around where the 
plants were positioned had been subjected to 
tsunamis of a greater magnitude than allowed for in 
the design.  This meant that the steps taken to 
protect the plant were well below that which was 
necessary to over-ride the accident. 
Since they had failed to take action, it followed 
that their emergency disaster procedures would be 
less than adequate, so the staff at the plants were 
less prepared and practiced to take care of the 
subsequent stages of the accident progression.  
Often in responding to accidents time is of the 
essence.  In this accident time was lost because of 
the lack of preparedness due, in fact, to the 
incorrect decision-making of management. 
Given their state of unpreparedness, the station 
staff did extremely well in trying to prevent further 
damage to the reactor cores and the release of 
radioactivity.  Often, as can be seen from the INPO 
report [10], their work was often undermined by 
subsequent hydrogen explosions, which destroyed 
equipment and led to obstructions hindering further 
attempts at fixing the problems.  Because of the 
tsunami flooding, most of the electrical equipment 
did not work.  Diesel generators failed, batteries 
failed and switchgear flooded, the result was pumps 
did not work, indicators did not show reactor 
conditions, lights were unavailable, etc.  The station 
personnel were put into the position trying to get 
things working by bringing car batteries, going into 
very dark areas to try to manually operate valves, 
etc. 
These persons had to evaluate and plan to do 
operations, ab initio, under the direction of the 
station manager.  Consequently, the accident 
progressed faster than the personnel could effect 
change.  One of things that the local personnel did 
was to form a tight group trying to effect a credible 
response to the accident, so the normal NPP 
organization morphed to a smaller organization, see 
figure 8. 
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 Figure 8 Emergency Daiichi Organization 
 
The figure shows the presence of the Japanese 
Prime minister, who was involved, and others.  
However, the principal burden was on the skills and 
tenacity of the site personnel.   
The emergency organizational model is in fact a 
VSM model, which evolves in emergency 
conditions from the normal VSM organizational 
model. The decision-making, communications and 
control dynamics are features of a cybernetic 
process.  In order to be effective, the organizations 
needs to be trained, practiced, and have both 
procedures and ancillary equipment to support the 
timely actions of the operators.   
 
 VI COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Although many of the accidents that have 
occurred over the years have had an effect upon the 
nuclear industry, some have had a more significant 
effect than others.  The TMI accident had a large 
effect, since there was a forced change in the 
appreciation of the role of humans in terminating 
and mitigating accidents.  This then led to changes 
in the industry relative to training, type of 
emergency procedures and displays to assist 
operators perform their tasks.  Other accidents have 
clearly displayed the need for better monitoring of 
top management decision-making.  This has been 
borne out by a number of accidents mentioned in 
the list at the beginning of the paper.   
 
For example, the Challenger accident, in a way it 
was a certainty, since the top NASA pre-empted the 
advice of the engineers and further more went 
looking for others that would support their ill 
advised decision.   
The Tepco management decision not to increase 
the height of the tsunami protection and further 
look at better defences against water ingress in the 
zones where there were electrical equipment was 
another poor decision.  
In some ways, the decisions taken by NU top 
management were worse, in that they were warned 
by their own staff, the NRC and INPO against 
doing what they doing.  Additionally, the PUC also 
were concerned relative to the reliability of 
electrical services and they pointed out they were 
not looking to pressure NU to reduce the cost of 
electricity. 
In the case of BP and the Gulf disaster, there did 
not seem to be pressure from BP top management 
to complete drilling the well, but clearly the local 
management felt a pressure to push ahead strongly, 
when there were voices saying hold on and check 
before pushing ahead.  So this was a poor decision, 
again against advice.  Also, there did not seem to be 
any attention paid to the risk fact as to the possible 
consequences of a bad decision.  Equally, one must 
also hold the US Government responsible for not 
deciding to take steps to contain the oil spill, timely 
action by the Government to organize a quick 
response and use other countries ships could have 
reduced the size of the spill and protected the states 
in the Gulf from the effects of the oil spill.  So lack 
of timely decision-making is not restricted to 
industry. 
The Fukushima or Daiichi accident is a 
wonderful case to examine for issues.  There are a 
number of issues that we can examine and provide 
some suggestions that might help reduce accidents 
in the future.  One thing that can be said before 
proceeding is that the VSM model of an 
organization provides one with a good vehicle to 
analyse organizations because it focuses on the 
dynamics in the organization as to who is making 
decisions and who is taking them.  The other thing 
that one should accept is that sometimes the 
management decision is not in the same time frame 
as an accident.  For example in the case of the 
Challenger accident, the decision to select the 
jointed version of the solid rocket boosters was 
made a long time before it became an issue. 
A review of the Daiichi accident clearly points to 
the main fault, that the management was not 
prudent enough and hoped that the tsunami 
defences were sufficient.  They used PRA methods 
to obfuscate the issue of the tsunami.  PRA 
techniques are useful to check the main safety 
situations, but one must use very carefully chosen 
probabilities to represent the plant, the crews and 
also the frequency of initiating events.  Often, one 
looks at events with a probability of 1E-3/year to 
define the design basis accident initiator.  In this 
case the selected probability of a large tsunami was 
nearer 1E-2 and estimated not to exceed 18.7feet. 
It is recommended that one should look for 
weaknesses in the design by looking the sensitivity 
of design features by incrementally changing the 
initiating event size, i.e. height of water (floods), 
wind velocity (hurricanes), etc.  Carrying this out 
here would have revealed the weakness of the 
design to flooding, leading to a complete blackout, 
with loss of diesels, batteries, switchgear and 
instrumentation.  It is clearly the function of the 
CNO to sponsor this type of consideration on behalf 
of the utility.     
It is interesting to note that the Japanese Prime 
Minister’s office had a group of advisors, Nuclear 
Safety Committee to offer advice on nuclear safety 
philosophy.  Later, the Chair of this committee 
 criticized Tepco and authorities for their attitude to 
safety.       
One of the lessons from the TMI accident was the 
move from event-based procedures to symptom-
based procedures.  It appears that a similar type of 
approach could be used here in dealing with the 
emergence disaster procedures.  In other words 
move from a set of defined events to determine how 
the station personnel respond to a set of ill defined 
events, which can destroy many of the tools and 
aids set aside to help recover the plant.  Time is of 
importance here, since the message from Daiichi is 
respond quickly, before the situation gets worse, so 
one should practice the actions to be taken under 
these kinds of conditions.  In the Daiichi accident: 
no lights, blocked access, slow responses from 
outside, no backup high pressure pumps with diesel 
power, and some design features inhibiting progress. 
Vents to disperse hydrogen and other gases were 
difficult to operate under these conditions, 
ultimately led to hydrogen build up and explosions.  
The damage caused by these hydrogen explosions 
led to further problems for the teams, including 
injury to their members.  
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